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Federal Judges Need Competing Information to Rival the 
Misleading Guidelines at Sentencing 
Federal district judges are stuck in a bad marriage with the 
U.S. Sentencing Guidelines after Booker v. Unittd States.' 
While most of the sentencing debate centers around the 
struggle over judicial discretion and power to control sen-
tencing outcomes, 2 little attention is given to how poorly we 
inform the sentencing court's discretion. The information 
provided to the court at sentencing is lacking and outdated. 
The Booker Court freed district judges from the "mandatory 
guideline era" (rg88-2oo5),3 but also required that district 
judges continue to calculate, "consult," and explain var-
iances from the applicable guideline range.4 A sentencing 
court needs better, competing information to rival the dis-
tracting and often misleading Guidelines.5 
In white-collar cases, the Guidelines' numbers and cal-
culations often distort the true story of an individual and his 
or her offense conduct. The guideline provisions related to 
loss,6 victims, and the defendant's role in the offense7 long 
have drawn criticism. Senior District Judge Jed S. Rakoff. 
when speaking about the Guidelines in a March 2013 key-
note address, criticized the Guidelines and their effect on 
district judges' sentencing determinations.8 Judge Rakoff, 
like some other judges, favors a multifactor, nonmathe-
matic test.9 In fact, Judge Rakoff offered his "modest pro-
posal" that the Guidelines be "scrapped in their entirety.''10 
I questioned aspects of that approach and argued that we 
invite more problems than we solve by offering less infor-
mation and guidance to judges at sentencing. 11 This article 
is a call for more information to be made available to judges 
at sentencing. 
The unjustified numbers and calculations in the 
Guidelines dominate the analysis and distract the court at 
sentencing.u The Sentencing Commission has never 
articulated on what basis it assigns a 2-level enhancement 
to another Sso,ooo in loss, the next 40 victims of 
a scheme, or for that matter, an additional 20 grams of 
heroin. Judge Rakoff rightly called the numbers in the 
Guidelines "unjustified" and "artificially infiated.''' 3 Yet, 
no information dictates the ultimate sentence imposed 
more than the numbers in the Guidelines. Information 
provided to the court about the individual qualities of the 
defendant and specific circumstances of the crime typi-
cally modify, and take a back seat to, the unsupported 
mathematics of the Guidelines.'4 If the numbers and 
calculations in the Guidelines continue as the best 
information we provide to the court,'5 then the sentencing 
goals of consistency and proportionality will be aspira-
tional only, but not real. 
The federal criminal justice system focuses more on who 
has the power to sentence than on why a specific sentence is 
fair in this case for this defendant. This article first argues 
that the focus on, and power struggle over, judicial discre-
tion is misplaced. Neither granting judges increased dis-
cretion, nor Congress' next piece of sentencing legislation 
designed to restrict judicial discretion, improves the pro· 
cess, or outcomes, of federal sentencing. 
Next, the Supreme Court mangled the process of federal 
sentencing. This article posits that if the judges are proce-
durally wed to the Guidelines, then we must improve the 
process in two ways. First, the Commission should phase 
out the numbers and calculations in the Guidelines, yet 
preserve the Guidelines' framework as the multifactor test 
for the Probation Office to describe in a Presentence 
Report. ' 6 Second, Probation should furnish the court with 
better, competing information to rival the Guidelines' 
numbers and calculations.'7 Federal sentencing can achieve 
uniformity and proportionality by providing more mean-
ingful, less unjustified information to district judges. 
Lastly, this article offers three broad classifications of 
material to better inform a district judge's discretion at 
sentencing: (r) "big data" designed to truly promote con-
sistency and proportionality after Booker; (2) a searchable, 
comparable case database; and (3) contractual agreements 
or recommendations from the parties. 
I. Struggling over Judicial Discretion, Instead of 
Informing It 
The Booker Court restored sentencing discretion to federal 
district judges. The Court, however, saddled the district 
judge's process with the distracting and often misleading 
numbers and calculations supplied by the Guidelines. The 
numbers in the Guidelines are as arbitrary and unjustified 
after Booker as they were when mandatory. The Court, 
however, required that the sentencing court must calculate 
and consult the applicable guideline range for an offense-
in perpetuity. The process itself negatively affects judicial 
discretion. 
The "calculate and consult procedure" of post-Booker 
federal sentencing appears to align with the sentencing 
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goals of uniformity and proportionality.18 In the initial years 
immediately following Booker, a district judge may have 
benefited from consulting how a similarly situated defen-
dant was sentenced from the mandatory guideline era. 
Today, eight years later, forcing a district judge to consider 
numbers and calculations from a twenty-year stretch in 
history has, and will continue to, become increasingly less 
helpful. By comparison, consider how infrequently, if ever, 
a judge imposing a sentence during the mandato:r;y guide-
line era referenced pre-Guidelines sentencing decisions to 
inform her decision. Interestingly, however, the bad mar-
riage to the Guidelines and the need for better information 
at sentencing has not been the discussion in federal 
sentencing. 
A. The Struggle to Control Sentencing Outcomes 
Much of the debate in federal sentencing over the last forty 
years resembles a·tug-of.war over judicial discretion. Con-
gress and the Sentencing Commission through its man-
datory guidelines dictated sentencing outcomes in federal 
courts for nearly twenty years. Then the Supreme Court in 
Booker tugged the rope back over to favor judicial discretion. 
Congress now seeks to legislate new ways to tie the court's 
hands at sentencing.'9 As imposed federal sentences con-
tinue to slide downward away from the once "applicable" 
guideline range, legislators inevitably will consider step-
ping in to reassert control. One of the few consistencies 
related to sentencing outcomes has been the power struggle 
to control them. 
When either side-either Congress and the Commission 
or the judiciary-gains an advantage in the struggle over 
sentencing power, other problems in the criminal justice 
system arise. On the one hand, Congress and the Com-
mission fight to standardize sentencing results and curb 
judicial discretion. Yet, when we curb a district judge's 
discretion at sentencing with mandatory minimum sen-
tences and prejudicial sentencing enhancements, the pro-
cess reeks of rigidity and cannot properly incorporate 
individual and case-specific circumstances. No party in the 
federal criminal justice system~ven prosecutors-wants 
to return to the inflexibility of the mandatory guideline 
era.~0 
On the other hand, district judges clamored for more 
discretion to tailor their decisions to individual circum-
stances and defendants. Yet, left unbounded, federal sen-
tencing cannot achieve its goals of consistency and 
proportionality. District judges ascend from a spectrum of 
professional and personal experiences. For example, a sig-
nificant percentage of district judges, who practiced and 
presided over criminal matters during the mandatory 
guideline era, may adhere more closely to Guideline sen-
tences. The blind adherence could be habit,21 but it could 
also indicate a judge's misplaced notions of consistency or 
a lack of information to better exercise her discretion. ~z 
Further, the workings of the federal criminal justice system 
break down when sentencing lacks predictability for the 
individual defendant.2 3 
B. Neither More Judicial Discretion nor More Binding 
Legislation Assists the Process of Sentencing 
Neither the judiciary's renewed discretion nor the prospect 
of more legislatively mandated sentences improves the 
process of sentencing. The sentencing judge merely reads 
a report about the crime and the individual defendant 
before imposing i!life-altering sentence. Legislators know 
even less about individual defendants when they propose 
legislation aimed at guaranteed sentencing outcomes. 
The parties to a federal criminal case who know the 
most about the offense conduct and the offender-the 
defendant and prosecutor-inexplicably have the least 
input into the sentence imposed. ~4 Of the federal criminal 
cases charged, 90 percent or more end in guilty pleas. ~s 
The procedural rule governing pleas provides for a recom-
mendation from, or binding agreements of, the parties.26 
Yet, these provisions are severely underutilized. Joint party 
recommendations and binding agreements under Federal 
Rule of Criminal Procedure n(c)(r) remain the rare excep-
tion, not the rule. Why? Because many district judges dis-
favor input from the parties, believing that binding 
agreements either invade their judicial discretion or reduce 
their role at sentencing to a rubber stamp. 2 7 
In the struggle over power to control sentencing, the 
process and the quality of the information provided to the 
court at sentencing have suffered. The information avail-
able to the district judge at sentencing is weak and outdated. 
Then it is organized under the Guidelines' distorted and 
unhelpful numbers and calculations, which dominate the 
court's attention. Technological advances and informa-
tional advancement have passed by, while the static, out-
dated report sent to chambers before sentencing remains 
largely unchanged. Elsewhere in industry~ven elsewhere 
in government-information is high-speed, on-demand, 
and optimized to the user's needs. When it comes to sen-
tencing in federal court, judges might as well be carrying 
around a typewriter and white-out. 
C. Current Information in a Presentence Report 
To promote the sentencing goals of consistency and pro-
portionality, the federal judiciary receives a thick Presen-
tence Report (PSR) prepared by the U.S. Probation Office. 
PSRs contain a lot of information-far more information 
than may be provided to state, military, or other criminal 
judges imposing sentence. A typical PSR includes social 
work-type details about the individual defendant. It 
includes the case-related details which, especially in the 
more than 90 percent of cases resolved by guilty plea, are 
no more than recycled, factual summaries from investiga-
tive reports.28 The only new information in PSRs comes 
from victim impact statements and letters from supporters. 
In a white-collar case, for example, the numerous para-
graphs in a PSR broadly describe the defendant's role in the 
fraud scheme within a larger organization, the theory of 
loss, and the number of victims, from the perspective of the 
investigators. Then these paragraphs are modified by, and 
reduced to, a number-again, an unjustified, arbitrary 
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number. For example, a +14 sentencing enhancement is 
applied for a loss amount of $866,ooo. When the judge 
reads the description, she cannot help but be instantly 
affected by the numerical modifier. Much like today's 
online reviews of products and services that reduce 
unending streams of information to "4-stars," "8o percent 
satisfied," and "thumbs down" ratings, the rating dwarfs 
the reasoning. The reader naturally reacts to the classifica-
tion and the easily digestible number assigned more so 
than the underlying descriptions. 
Congress empowered the Sentencing Commission to 
create the Sentencing Guidelines and report sentencing 
data back to Congress.2 9 It also told Probation Offices to 
include calculations based on the applicable guidelines as 
part of the PSR. The Guidelines represent the most 
impactful math word problem anywhere in criminal law. 
However, these numbers and calculations, despite their 
importance, still lack justification.l0 
The Guidelines have always valued formulas, even 
unjustified formulas, over individuals and individual cir-
cumstances-and nothing has changed in the decade of 
post-Booker analysis. Section 2Br.1, the fraud guideline,l' 
possibly ranks as the most stark example. It treats individ-
ual sentencing outcomes like the estimated monthly pay-
ment spit-out of a mortgage calculator. The single 
overpowering factor of loss amount32 and the stubborn 
adherence to "relevant conduct" weigh heavily against 
white-collar offenders. With the Guidelines, white-collar 
offenders evolved from the traditionally under-sentenced to 
the most consistently over-sentenced sector of federal 
defendants. The federal judiciary must improve the process 
of sentencing, and to do so, it needs other data and non-
mathematical information so the Guidelines do not con-
tinue to have an overshadowing effect on sentencing 
determinations. 
II. The Two Solutions 
We can solve the procedural drawbacks of federal sentenc-
ing caused by the Booker court in two ways. The first way, 
while politically unlikely, is to retain the narrative section of 
the PSR that corresponds to the Guidelines provisions yet 
phase out the accompanying numbers and calculations. The 
second way, discussed in greater detail in Section III below, 
is to provide new, competing information to district judges 
at sentencing to rival the numbers and calculations of the 
Guidelines. 
A. Phase Out the Numbers and Calculations of the 
Guidelines 
The federal government should phase out the numbers and 
calculations in the Guidelines. As opposed to scrapping 
them completely, the federal government should convert 
the Guidelines into factors that the court must consider. 
District judges could consult the Guidelines as specific 
factors to consider in individual cases. The numbers and 
calculations, however, have no sustainable utility. Modern 
district judges do not consider available sentencing data 
from the decades of sentences preceding the Guidelines, 
because most imposed sentences from the past eras are not 
helpful to judges imposing a sentence tomorrow. 
Judge Rakoffhypothesized that with multifactored, 
nonnumeric guidance alone, judges would better justify 
their sentences.33 I offer some words of caution for that 
idea. First, requiring judges to consider broad sentencing 
principles was unsuccessful before the Guidelines.34 Sec-
ond, the Supreme Court already mandated that federal 
district judges not only calculate and consult the Guidelines 
but also consider the long-forgotten sentencing maxims in 
Title 18, United States Code, § 3553(a).35 This "factors to be 
considered when imposing sentence" statute includes 
non-numeric guidance, such as "the need for the sentence 
imposed ... to reflect the seriousness of the offense, to 
promote respect for the law, and to provide just punish-
ment for the offense."36 Judges, for the most part, parrot 
the language of the non-numeric guidance and merely 
touch the bases to pass appellate review. The federal crim-
inal justice system should maintain the structure, organi-
zation, and considerations of the Guidelines, but do away 
with the distracting and misleading numbers and calcula-
tions that accompany the Guidelines. Redacting the num-
bers and calculations from the Guidelines would provide 
a middle ground between our current system and Judge 
Rakoffs proposal. It also would ensure more robust judicial 
reasoning for an imposed sentence by the district judge. 
For example, in a fraud case, Probation would continue 
to describe the scheme to defraud under the familiar head-
ings, but without the numbers and calculations. The court 
would pay greater attention to the actual offense conduct 
organized under the Guidelines' headings, including the 
dollar amount of the loss, basis of the calculation, number 
of victims, and the defendant's role in the scheme. District 
judges have imposed sentences pulling further away from 
the Guidelines each year since 2005, when the Court 
decided Booker.37 The numbers and calculations of the 
Guidelines will carry less and less weight for a sentencing 
judge as more time passes. Phase out the numbers and 
calculations now before they represent a functionally irrel-
evant "anchoring point" for judges at sentencing.l8 
Further, the numbers and calculations of the Guidelines 
have severely cluttered the appellate courts' true, indepen-
dent ability to review sentences for reasonableness. A cir-
cuit court's substantive "reasonableness" review on appeal 
has repeatedly turned on the reasonableness of the appli-
cable guideline as much as whether the court's imposed 
sentence was reasonable.39 If we phase out the numbers 
and calculations within the Guidelines, then the appellate 
courts' review and the "reasonableness" standard also will 
become more robust and meaningful. 
B. Provide New, Competing Information 
The second solution is to provide district judges with dif-
ferent, competing information to the unhelpful, misleading 
guidelines. This solution is feasible with a reallocation of 
resources and attention. Particularly with today's 
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technological advances and the availability oflimitless data, 
district judges armed with renewed discretion need more 
and better quality information at sentencing. As set forth 
below, district judges could be better informed and the 
goals of sentencing better served with (1) sentencing data 
reports, (2) searchable, comparable-case databases, and (3) 
party recommendations and agreements. This information 
should become part of PSRs and be made available to the 
sentencing court in addition to the numbers and calculation 
of the Guidelines. Over time, district courts will pay equal 
or greater attention to other information at sentencing, like 
the types discussed below, as compared to the numbers and 
calculations of Guidelines. 
Ill. Proposed New Information at Sentencing 
The conversation must progress beyond the tussle over 
judicial discretion to the resources we devote to informing 
the court's discretion at sentencing. 
A. "Big Data" of Post-Booker Sentencing Statistics 
"Big data" is a twenty-first-century term of art that refers to 
the "tools, processes and procedures allowing an organi-
zation to create, manipulate, and manage very large data 
sets and storage facilities."40 Many traditional models have 
been ushered into retirement because of our capability to 
gather and interpret vast amounts of data. Today, we gather 
big data on everything and then adapt the way we slice and 
evaluate the data to our needs. The post-Booker sentencing 
data, properly gather~d and analyzed, could inform district 
judges' discretion with real-world, meaningful numbers. 
Businesses enhance profits, curb expenses, improve 
marketing efforts, and optimize customer interaction by 
processing and interpreting large volumes of data. Even our 
leisure plans,4' personal fitness ,42 talent predictors in 
sports,43 and traditional educational systems44 have been 
forever disrupted45 by those who gather and interpret the 
available data. Unlike the Guidelines' arbitrary numbers 
assigned to certain conduct or circumstances, big data 
allows human behavior to produce empirically justified 
numbers. Efficient, smart, and successful organizations 
don't assign arbitrarily created numbers to conduct; 
instead, they gather and interpret actual data derived from 
behavior. 
In the context of federal sentencing, the Probation 
Office or some other entity could slice useful data for the 
court.46 A court, for instance, could receive data about the 
percentage of district judges who applied a downward var-
iance, and to what degree, in fraud cases with a loss of more 
than $mo million. The Commission collects and reports to 
Congress about some federal sentencing data. For the post-
Booker sentencing data that details district judges' behavior 
and results, the Commission reports its statistics under 
general crime labels, months of confinement averages, and 
downward departures and variances, with and without . 
a government or defense motion. Although the Commis-
sion's Booker Reports are publically available, this data is 
not even part of the PS R in a specific case. If we gather the 
data, then we should organize and analyze it in a way 
helpful to the district court during sentencing. For example, 
the PSR could include regional sentencing and district 
statistics in different categories of cases and specific offense 
conduct characteristics since 2005, state statistics of com-
parable offense conduct,47 or variance percentages orga-
nized according to specific guidelines' provisions or factual 
commonalities. For example, in a fraud case, a sentencing 
judge could focus on data related to sentences that applied 
a particular enhancement or involved a threshold level of 
loss or victims. 
This does not happen currently, but it could soon. If this 
data is available already and used so widely elsewhere in 
business and society, then the federal government should 
use the information to assist in one of our most important 
societal determinations, the sentencing of criminal 
defendants. 
B. Comparative Cases, Keywords, and 
User-Optimized Results 
Next, the Probation Office could provide or make available 
more user-optimized information to district judges before 
sentencing. The PSR, a static report developed from other 
reports, is outdated and lacking functionality. Competitive 
industry long ago would have organized and made search-
able a comparable case analysis from hundreds of similar 
decisions made each day through the country. Instead, 
a district judge considers only her own prior cases or, at 
best, the other judges in the building. More comparable 
cases could inform the court's discretion at sentencing. 
In the age of optimized search results, the judiciary 
should devote resources to a database capable of geo-
graphic, judge-specific, and other "search term" limitations 
to isolate similar cases. After Booker, the district court ide-
ally should better explain the reasoning underlying its 
imposed sentences. District judges should benefit from the 
reasoning offered by their colleagues-and not just the 
judge down the hall. Each imposed sentence, set of find-
ings, judgment, and sentencing hearing transcript provides 
numerical information outside of the Guidelines' numbers, 
coupled with analysis and reasoning. Imagine if one federal 
court could access a database that captured all post-Booker 
sentences, logically coded with tags and search terms to 
facilitate a user-optimized search. 
The database, even if not searched by the sentencing 
judge in a given case, could produce a digest of comparable 
cases, complete with a summary of the underlying judicial 
reasoning and charts of the imposed sentences. Conceiv-
ably, the database could be closed and available only inter-
nally to the network of district judges, and thus, judges 
could offer additional (internal use only) notes and tags to 
assist the next judge handing down a sentence to a similarly 
situated defendant. In a white-collar case, for example, the 
defendant's applicable guideline may call for 120-132 
months' imprisonment based upon the amount ofloss and 
niunber of victims. The comparable case database, how-
ever, may reveal that in fraud cases with the same loss and 
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number of victims around the country, judges sentenced on 
average only 65 months' imprisonment and only 14 percent 
of courts imposed a Guideline sentence, followed by the 
reasoning of several federal judges. The numbers and rea· 
soning could truly inform the next judge's discretion. 
C. Recommendations or Contractual Agreements of 
the Parties 
Prosecutors, working with the defense, are better posi-
tioned to resolve cases and justify fair and reasonable sen· 
tences than federal district judges. Federal Rule of Criminal 
Procedure n(c)(r) permits prosecutors and counsel for 
criminal defendants to jointly recommend48 or contract for 
a binding or "agreed-upon" sentence.49 As compared to 
district judges, the prosecution and defense are in the best 
position to articulate their justification for a recommenda-
tion or an agreed-upon sentence in a written plea agree-
ment and in open court. Yet, the parties rarely use Rule 
n(c)(r) and, therefore, seldom provide their joint recom-
mendation to district judges. 
District judges cannot participate in plea discussion~. 
But the parties may and should negotiate a specific, 
numerical outcome and communicate it to the court. By 
comparison, the joint recommendation of the parties con-
trols sentencing in the military justice system. In state 
court, the parties routinely negotiate and jointly propose 
sentencing recommendations to the court. Somewhere 
along the way, the unwritten (and judge-by-judge) rule in 
most federal courts discouraged federal criminal litigants 
from doing the same, despite the clear intent of the legis-
lators in Rule n(c)(r). 
Most federal sentencing hearings proceed without any 
joint recommendation or specific agreement from the 
parties. Many district judges, because of their long struggle 
for discretion, simply disfavor agreed-upon sentences from 
the parties. Because defense attorneys would support more 
joint recommendations and agreements that, by their very 
nature, fall below the applicable Guideline range, it is the 
judiciary and the U.S. Department of Justice that stand in 
the way of the procedural change. DOJ could change this 
policy immediately with an_Attomey General directive to all 
prosecutors. The federal judiciary similarly could invite 
recommendations and agreements in the district "local 
rules" or local practice. 
A district judge should find this information from the 
parties more meaningful than the distracting and mis-
leading Guidelines. Ironically, the Supreme Court intended 
the advisory Guidelines to promote judicial discretion to 
ensure uniform, proportional, and fair punishment. To do 
so, the district court gives great weight to arbitrary numbers 
and calculations assigned by a legislatively created agency 
without regard for individual defendants facing sentencing. 
The court, at the same time, discourages or wholly rejects 
agreed-upon input from the government who brought the 
case to court and the individual facing sentencing. 
Although joint recommendations and binding plea agree· 
ments do suffer from some limitations, these tools are far 
more reliable than the Guideline numbers that currently 
dominate the sentencing court's attention. 
IV. Conclusion 
If the goal is better judicial reasoning for federal sentences, 
then do not force judges to calculate and consider distract· 
ing and misleading numbers in the Guidelines. We must 
provide better, competing information-more numeric 
data, other than the numbers in the Guidelines, as well as 
searchable, non-numeric description to the courts. With 
a smart and pointed reallocation of resources, the federal 
criminal justice system could move away from the arbitrary 
and unhelpful information provided to judges at sentencing 
toward useful and meaningful information. 
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